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INTRODUCTION
The National Substance Abuse Index states that methamphetamine is becoming 
the largest drug pandemic in Alabama.1 Between 2002 and 2006, there were 1,432 
* Rachel Suppé is a third-year law student at American University Washington College of Law. At 
American University, she is the Senior Content Editor of the Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
the Law, and President of the law school’s chapter of Law Students for Reproductive Justice. She 
is interested in gender studies and plans to pursue a legal career advancing women’s rights. Her 
past work experiences include internships at the National Women’s Law Center, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, and the office of U.S. Senator Kirsten 
Gillibrand. Currently, she is a legal intern at the Center for Reproductive Rights. 
1 Alabama: Drug Climate, NaT’l SUBSTaNCe aBUSe INDex, http://nationalsubstanceabuseindex.org/
alabama/index.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Alabama: Drug Climate].
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methamphetamine lab seizures within the State.2 Due to a growing concern that 
Alabama’s children were being exposed to the dangerous chemicals used in the 
production of drugs such as methamphetamine, the State passed what has become 
known as its “chemical endangerment law” in 2006.3 The law indicates that a person 
commits the crime of chemical endangerment when he or she knowingly, recklessly, or 
intentionally exposes a child to contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, 
or other drug paraphernalia.4 Violation of the statute is a felony.5
While the law had admirable aims and sought to protect children forced to grow up in 
clandestine at-home methamphetamine labs, it was not long before Alabama prosecutors 
gave the statute new meaning by using it prosecute women who tested positive for drugs 
during pregnancy. Sixty women in Alabama have been prosecuted under the statute thus 
far—a number which continues to rise.6 Medical, pro-choice, and anti-poverty groups 
have challenged use of the law in this manner, arguing that the law was not intended 
to criminalize women whose fetuses are exposed to controlled substances in utero. On 
January 11, 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court rendered a perilous opinion in Ex parte 
Ankrom,7 holding that the term “child” in the chemical endangerment statute applies to 
fetuses, and that women who take controlled substances while pregnant can and will be 
charged with felonies.8
Part I of this article discusses the rising use of methamphetamine, and state and federal 
responses to the growing epidemic. It discusses Alabama’s attempt to shield children 
from methamphetamine labs and state prosecutors’ subsequent use of the law to convict 
pregnant women. Part I also examines the case of two women, Amanda Kimbrough and 
Hope Ankrom, whose convictions under the chemical endangerment statute reached the 
Alabama Supreme Court. Part II of this article argues that the Alabama Supreme Court 
erred in its decision that the term “child” in the statute included fetuses and erred in 
finding the convictions proper. Part III discusses policy considerations and recommends 
the use of medical treatment, rather than incarceration, to address drug use. Lastly, 
Part IV argues that the Alabama State Legislature should clarify that the chemical 
endangerment law may not be used to prosecute pregnant women, as such a use has 
dangerous implications for the State’s women and families.
2 Alabama: Substance Abuse Statistics, National Substance Abuse, http://nationalsubstanceabuseindex.
org/alabama/stats.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
3 See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Rep. Patricia Todd on Behalf of Petitioner, Ex parte Ankrom, 
No. 1110176, (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Todd Brief].
4 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2012).
5 Id.
6 Cameron Steele, Fetal Argument: County DA to Begin Prosecution of Mothers Who Use Drugs 
During Pregnancy, aNNISTON STaR (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.annistonstar.com/view/full_
story/20320041/article-Fetal-Argument—County-DA-to-begin—prosecution-of-mothers-who-use-
drugs-during-pregnancy.
7 No. 1110176, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).
8 See id. at *19.
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I. BaCkgROUND
a. National and state level methamphetamine statistics
There are currently more than 1.4 million methamphetamine users in the United 
States, and the number continues to rise.9 Methamphetamine, or “meth,” is a highly 
addictive stimulant with potent central nervous system stimulant properties.10 Though 
methamphetamine is legally available under certain conditions, it is a Schedule II 
stimulant under the Controlled Substances Act.11 Methamphetamine produces a brief, 
intense sensation or rush, and oral ingestion or snorting methamphetamine produces a 
long-lasting high which lasts up to half a day. 12 Both the rush and the high are believed 
to result from the release of very high levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine into areas 
of the brain that regulate feelings of pleasure.13 Due to its intense high, highly addictive 
nature, easy accessibility, and low cost, methamphetamine has become one of the most 
popular drugs in use in the U.S. today.14 The largest population of methamphetamine 
users tends to be the Caucasian rural poor.15 Within Alabama, the state’s overall poverty 
rate is 17.5 percent with rural areas having a higher poverty level than urban areas.16 
Nearly half of Alabama’s methamphetamine users are female and ninety-two percent of 
Alabama’s drug users are white.17 The National Substance Abuse Index, an independent 
guide to addiction resources throughout the U.S., reports that “[m]eth is becoming the 
biggest drug threat in Alabama” and methamphetamine abuse surpasses cocaine abuse 
statewide.18
Distributors of methamphetamine have taken to making the product at home in what 
have been referred to as “meth labs.” Ingredients for methamphetamine can be obtained 
at any local pharmacy, as the main ingredient used to produce methamphetamine 
is found in the widely available, non-prescription drug Sudafed, which contains 
9 The Reach of Meth, fRONTlINe (May 16, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meth/
map/.
10 Drugs of Abuse 2011, U.S. DeP’T Of jUSTICe DRUG eNfORCemeNT aDmIN 48 (2011), http://www.
justice.gov/dea/docs/drugs_of_abuse_2011.pdf.
11 See id. at 49 (stating that methamphetamine is available only through a prescription that cannot 
be refilled and that there is only one legal methamphetamine product, Desoxyn, which is currently 
marketed in 5-milligram tablets and has very limited use in the treatment of obesity and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)).
12 Id. at 48. 
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 fla. ST. U. l. Rev. 841, 
884-85, 895 (2010).
16 alaBama DeP’T Of meNTal healTh, OffICe Of PReveNTION, alCOhOl, TOBaCCO, aND OTheR DRUGS: 
CONSUmPTION aND CONSeQUeNCeS IN alaBama 5 (2011) [hereinafter alCOhOl, TOBaCCO, aND OTheR 
DRUGS: CONSUmPTION aND CONSeQUeNCeS IN alaBama], http://www.mh.alabama.gov/Downloads/SA/
ALStateEPIProfilefinal_2011-11-22.pdf.
17 Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions by Primary Substance of Abuse According to Sex, Age 
Group, Race, and Ethnicity Year = 2010, SUBSTaNCe aBUSe aND meNTal healTh SeRv. aDmIN., CTR. 
fOR BehavIORal healTh STaTISTICS aND QUalITy, available at http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/webt/
quicklink/AL10.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
18 Alabama: Drug Climate, supra note 1.
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pseudoephedrine, the most important ingredient in methamphetamine production.19 The 
production process involves the use and release of dangerous toxic chemicals, and the 
deadly toxic waste left from a methamphetamine lab is often discarded near schools, on 
roadsides, or at local parks.20
According to the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency, there were 11,239 clandestine 
methamphetamine lab seizures nationwide in 2010.21 Of those, 666, or approximately 
seventeen percent, were in Alabama.22 In 2010, 13,172 drug related arrests were reported 
in Alabama,23 and 2,220 of those arrests were for the sale of drugs including barbiturates, 
amphetamines, and methamphetamine.24 Within Alabama, methamphetamine labs 
tend to be located in isolated rural communities: 207 labs were seized in 2002, 280 in 
2003, and 297 in 2004.25 Methamphetamine is such a large problem in Alabama that 
the Alabama District Attorneys Association has sponsored an anti-methamphetamine 
awareness and educational campaign called Zero Meth with the goal of “stopping 
this drug and its life threatening consequences.”26 The campaign’s website states that 
“[m]eth is the number one drug related issue for law enforcement officials in Alabama” 
and that Zero Meth is Alabama’s response to the state’s growing epidemic.27
B. state Responses to methamphetamine Production and Use
Because so many methamphetamine labs are in homes, Alabama has become increasingly 
concerned about the effect that the drug’s toxic ingredients can have on the children 
living in those homes. The Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 
reports that “[a] child living at a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory is exposed to 
immediate dangers and to the ongoing effects of chemical contamination. In addition, 
the child may be subjected to fires and explosions, abuse and neglect, a hazardous 
lifestyle (including the presence of firearms), social problems, and other risks.”28 OJP’s 
website lists two specific examples which highlight the detrimental effect that at home 
methamphetamine labs can have on children:
The five children ranged in age from 1 to 7 years old. The one-bedroom home 
had no electricity or heat other than a gas stove with the oven door opened. 
Used hypodermic needles and dog feces littered areas of the residence where 
19 Ahrens, supra note 15, at 865.
20 ZeroMeth: Facts, alaBama DISTRICT aTTORNeyS aSS’N, available at http://www.zerometh.com/
facts.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
21 Neal Vickers, Meth Gets More Emphasis in Alabama, examINeR.COm (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.
examiner.com/article/meth-gets-more-emphasis-alabama.
22 Id.
23 See id. (adding that of those, fifteen percent were for sale of drugs and eighty-five percent were 
for possession).
24 Id.
25 Alabama: Drug Climate, supra note 1.
26 Zero Meth: Home, supra note 20.
27 Id.
28 Dangers to Children Living at Meth Labs, OffICe Of jUSTICe PROGRamS, U.S. DeP’T Of jUSTICe, 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/pg5.html (last visited Dec. 
3, 2013).
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the children were found playing. Because there were no beds for the children, 
they slept with blankets underneath a small card table in the front room. The 
bathroom had sewage backed up in the tub, leaving no place for the children to 
bathe. A subsequent hospital exam revealed that all the children were infected 
with hepatitis C. The youngest was very ill. His liver was enlarged to the size 
of an adult’s. The children had needle marks on their feet, legs, hands, and 
arms from accidental contact with syringes.
At another lab site, a 2-year-old child was discovered during a lab seizure. 
Her parents both abused and manufactured methamphetamine. She was found 
with open, seeping sores around her eyes and on her forehead that resembled 
a severe burn. The condition was diagnosed as repeated, untreated cockroach 
bites.29
In response to these dangers, states have undertaken a variety of efforts to protect 
children exposed to methamphetamine labs. For example, many states have established 
Drug Endangered Children Programs which coordinate the efforts of law enforcement, 
medical services, and child welfare workers to ensure that children found in these 
environments receive appropriate attention and care.30 Such programs are modeled 
after the national program created by the Federal Interagency Task Force for Drug 
Endangered Children.31 North Carolina, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas, and 
California are examples of states which have undertaken efforts, whether though 
training, policy, education, or research, to address the problem of children being 
exposed to methamphetamine.32
Some states have addressed the crisis legislatively. In Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia, child abuse or neglect 
includes manufacturing a controlled substance in the presence of child or on a premises 
occupied by a child.33 In Arizona and New Mexico, allowing a child to be present 
where there are chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of controlled substances or 
where controlled substances are used or stored is considered child abuse or neglect.34 In 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Texas, child abuse or neglect includes selling 
or distributing drugs, as well as, giving drugs or alcohol to a child.35 In Kentucky, New 
29 Id.
30 Methamphetamine Frequently Asked Questions, RURal aSSISTaNCe CeNTeR, available at http://
www.raconline.org/topics/substance-abuse/faqs/#meth (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
31 See Drug Endangered Children, OffICe Of NaTIONal DRUG CONTROl POlICy, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/dec-info (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
32 Methamphetamine and Child Welfare, aDmIN. fOR ChIlDReN & famIlIeS, U.S. DeP’T Of healTh 
aND hUmaN SeRvS., available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/substance/drug_specific/
meth.cfm#state (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
33 Feature: Methamphetamine as Child Abuse Laws Gain Ground, But Do They Help or Hurt?, 
DRUG RefORm COORDINaTION NeTWORk (July 14, 2006), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/444/
drug-child-abuse-laws.shtml.
34 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Parental Drug Use as Child Abuse, aDmIN. fOR ChIlDReN 
& famIlIeS, U.S. DeP’T Of healTh aND hUmaN SeRvS. (July 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/drugexposed.pdf.
35 Id. at 3.
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York, Rhode Island, and Texas, child abuse and neglect includes use of a controlled 
substance by a caregiver that impairs the caregiver’s ability to adequately care for the 
child.36 Exposing a child to drugs or drug paraphernalia is a crime in Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.37 Lastly, 
exposing a child to drug sale or distribution or to drug-related activity is a crime in the 
District of Columbia.38
C. enactment of alabama’s Chemical endangerment law
In 2006, Alabama joined the list of states in which it is a crime to expose a child to 
drugs.39 That year, the State legislature passed what has become known as Alabama’s 
chemical endangerment law. The law is housed under the title “Child Abuse Generally”40 
and utilizes strict penalties as a means of deterrence.41 Under the law (hereinafter § 26-
15-3.2), a person who knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally causes or permits a child 
to be exposed to, ingest or inhale, or have contact with a controlled substance, chemical 
substance, or drug paraphernalia, violates the statute.42 Causing or permitting a child to 
be exposed to, ingest or inhale, or have contact with a controlled substance, chemical 
substance, or drug paraphernalia is a Class C felony, resulting in up to ten years in 
prison and a fine of up to $15,000.43 If that exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact 
results in serious physical injury to the child, the crime is a Class B felony, resulting 
in up to twenty years in prison and a fine of up to $30,000.44 Finally, if the exposure, 
ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child, the crime is a Class A 
felony, which results in up to life behind bars and a fine of up to $60,000.45 In addition to 
fines and prison time, countless state and federal collateral consequences attach to such 
felony convictions.46 Under the Alabama statute, exposure of a child to any controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia, be it cocaine, marijuana, or 
certain prescription drugs, is a felony. The only exception is that it is not a felony to 
expose a child to a controlled substance which is lawfully prescribed to that child.47
36 Id.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id. at 10.
39 Id. at 3; Chemical Endangerment of Exposing a Child to an Environment in which Controlled 
Substance are Produced or Distributed, ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2006).
40 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2012).
41 H.B. 723, 2008 Sess. (Ala. 2008), Statement of Rep. McLaughlin, http://altaxdollarsatwork.
blogspot.com/2008/05/chemical-child-endangerment-debate.html (“My purpose in bringing this bill 
is to get help for that mother so she doesn’t do it again.”).
42 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2.
43 See id. (laying out the appropriate conviction designations for the violation of the statute); ala. 
CODe § 13A-5-11(2013) (providing the fines required for each class of felony); ala. CODe § 13A-5-
6 (2013) (providing the sentences of imprisonment for each class of felonies).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
47 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2(c).
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While the law was intended to punish parents who exposed their children to chemicals 
during the drug manufacturing process, Alabama began to see a rise in the number of 
babies testing positive for drugs at birth.48 Soon, prosecutors took it upon themselves 
to begin applying the chemical endangerment law in a new manner. Looking to the 
statute’s wording, prosecutors argued that the term “child” in the statute included fetuses 
as well as born children. Under this theory, they argued, women who expose fetuses to 
drugs in the womb violate the statute. As a result, in 2007 and 2008, eight women in one 
Alabama jurisdiction (population 37,000) were prosecuted in an eighteen-month period 
for drug use during pregnancy.49 The local prosecutor in the cases referred to the need 
to protect the “child-to-be” from prenatal drug use.50
The debate as to whether the word “child” included fetuses was settled by the Alabama 
Supreme Court, on January 11, 2013, in the case of Ex parte Ankrom.51 The Alabama 
Supreme Court opinion involved the consolidated cases of Hope Ankrom and Amanda 
Kimbrough, two women convicted under § 26-15-3.2. On April 29, 2008, during her 
twenty-fifth week of pregnancy, Amanda Kimbrough went into labor prematurely and 
had an emergency C-section at the hospital.52 Her premature infant died nineteen minutes 
after birth.53 A urine sample taken at the hospital tested positive for methamphetamine 
and Kimbrough later admitted to smoking methamphetamine three days before she went 
into labor.54 The Colbert Country Department of Human Resources was informed of the 
drug test results and Kimbrough’s two other children were temporarily removed from 
her custody.55 Kimbrough was ultimately sentenced to ten years in prison.56
Less than a year later, on January 31, 2009, Hope Ankrom gave birth to a healthy son 
at a medical center in Enterprise, Alabama.57 Medical records indicate that Ankrom 
tested positive for cocaine prior to giving birth and that the infant tested positive 
for cocaine after birth.58 Ankrom’s doctor also noted that she had tested positive for 
marijuana and cocaine during her pregnancy.59 Though she gave birth to a healthy 
baby, approximately three weeks after the birth, Ankrom was arrested and charged 
with chemical endangerment of a child.60 She was indicted by a grand jury and was 
48 Steele, supra note 6.
49 Krista Stone-Manista, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to Successfully Challenging 
Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Addicts, 99 j. CRIm. l. & CRImINOlOGy 823, 
825 (2008-2009).
50 Id.
51 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).
52 Id. at *23.
53 Id.
54 Id. at *4; see also ala. CODe § 20-2-27 (2013) (defining methamphetamine as a Schedule III 
controlled substance and therefore within the purview of the chemical endangerment law).
55 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *4.
56 Id.
57 Id. at *1.
58 Id.; see also ala. CODe § 20-2-25 (2013) (defining cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance 
and therefore within the purview of the chemical endangerment law).
59 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *1.
60 Id.
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sentenced to three years in prison, though her sentence was suspended and she was 
placed on probation for a year.61
Both women appealed their convictions to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. 
While the court did not publish its decision in Kimbrough’s case,62 on appeal, Ankrom 
argued that she could not be guilty under § 26-15-3.2, as it applied to endangerment of 
a child, not to endangerment of a fetus.63 The court held that her conviction was proper 
because the plain meaning of the term “child” includes a viable fetus and the court 
could only engage in judicial interpretation of the statute’s language if the language was 
ambiguous.64 
The court found the word “child” unambiguous for three reasons. First, it found that 
the Alabama Legislature had a policy of protecting “born and unborn life” and that the 
statute was therefore meant to protect born and unborn life.65 Second, the court noted 
that Alabama Supreme Court had previously interpreted the term “minor child” to 
include viable fetuses for purposes of Alabama’s wrongful-death-of-minor statute, and 
therefore the same interpretation should be applied to § 26-15-3.2.66 Finally, the court 
stated that the dictionary defines “child” as “an unborn or recently born person.”67 For 
these reasons, the court held, a mother who ingested a controlled substance during her 
pregnancy may be prosecuted for chemical endangerment if she tested positive for drugs 
during pregnancy or if the child tested positive at birth.68 Therefore, the guilty verdicts 
of the two women were sustained.69
As a matter of first impression, the Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
whether the term “child” as used in § 26-15-3.2 includes an unborn child.70 The high 
court upheld Kimbrough and Ankrom’s convictions, finding that the term “child” as 
used in the statute includes fetuses.71 The court stated that the term is unambiguous and 
therefore no judicial interpretation of the statute was required.72 Because the language 
of the statute was clear, the women had sufficient notice of their crime and the rule of 
lenity did not apply.73 Lastly, the court expanded the statute’s scope. While the lower 
court had held that this statue encompassed only viable fetuses,74 the Alabama Supreme 
Court held that the statue protected all fetuses, regardless of viability.75
61 Id. at *2.
62 Id. 
63 Ankrom v. State, 2011 WL 3781258 at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2011). 
64 Id. at *10-11.
65 Id. at *5.
66 Id.
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *11.
69 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *20.
70 Id. at *19.
71 Id. at *20.
72 Id. at *7.
73 Id. at *11.
74 Ankrom v. State, 2011 WL 3781258 at *7.
75 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *18.
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The prosecutions of pregnant women and the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court 
drew the attention of advocates from both the pro-choice76 and the anti-choice77 camps, 
as such laws can have drastic effects on abortion rights. “Fetal abuse” or “fetal neglect” 
laws afford legal protection to a fetus. Pro-choice advocates fear that such laws are steps 
towards establishing “fetal personhood,” or affording full legal protections to a fetus or 
embryro from the moment of conception.78 If a fetus is afforded such legal protection, 
pro-choice advocates contend, the fetus is legally considered a human being and thus 
cannot be aborted.79 Pro-choice groups contend, therefore, that “fetal abuse” and “fetal 
neglect” laws are used as a tactic to incrementally grant legal rights to a fetus, with the 
goal of eventually achieving full personhood and criminalizing abortion.80 Likewise, 
anti-choice groups readily admit they use such laws as a backdoor tactic aimed at 
criminalizing abortion.81
This Alabama Supreme Court decision makes Alabama only the second state, along with 
South Carolina,82 to hold that laws designed to protect children from exposure to drugs 
can be used to prosecute women for using drugs during their pregnancy. The courts 
of Texas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Kentucky, North Dakota, Missouri, Maryland, 
76 See, e.g., ACLU Asks Alabama Court To Protect The Rights Of Pregnant Women, am. CIvIl 
lIBeRTIeS UNION (July 6, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/aclu-asks-alabama-
court-protect-rights-pregnant-women (“The ACLU argues that using the law this way infringes 
on a woman’s fundamental right to continue a pregnancy and singles out pregnant women for 
discrimination. Similar attempts to punish pregnant women who suffer from addiction have been 
struck down as unconstitutional, as in a recent case in Kentucky in which the ACLU was also 
involved.”).
77 See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Alabama Court Rules Unborn Children Deserve Legal Protection, lIfe 
NeWS (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.lifenews.com/2013/01/11/alabama-court-rules-unborn-children-
deserve-legal-protection/ (discussing the amicus brief submitted by the anti-choice group Liberty 
Counsel, which asserted according to “medical science,” the unborn are, in fact, human beings and 
that the Alabama Supreme Court must therefore accord them with the full protection of the law).
78 Tamar Lewin, Abuse Laws Cover Fetus, a High Court Rules, Ny TImeS, Oct. 30, 1997, http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/10/30/us/abuse-laws-cover-fetus-a-high-court-rules.html.
79 See Personhood In The Womb: A Constitutional Question, NaT. PUB. RaDIO (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
www.npr.org/2013/11/21/246534132/personhood-in-the-womb-a-constitutional-question (explaining 
that the “personhood movement” seeks to recognize fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses as 
completely separate constitutional persons under the law in an effort to recriminalize abortion).
80 See id. (“If fetus is a person, everything a pregnant women does is potentially child abuse, 
abortion is murder . . . . ”); see also Personhood USA Surpasses 1 Million Signatures Against 
Abortion: Launches Groundbreaking Campaign for 10 Million, PeRSONhOOD USa, http://www.
personhoodusa.com/press-release/personhood-usa-surpasses-1-million-signatures-against-abortion-
launches-groundbreaking/ (explaining that in an effort to protect the unborn, the group is collecting 
signatures to implement ballot initiatives outlawing abortion).
81 See Jill Filipovic, The Flaws in Prosecuting Mothers who Suffer from Drug Addiction, The 
GUaRDIaN (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/26/
flaws-prosecuting-mothers-drug-addiction.
82 See Linda C. Fentiman, Rethinking Addition: Drugs, Deterrence, and the Neuroscience 
Revolution, 14 U. Pa. j. l. & SOC. ChaNGe 233, 237-38 (2011) (noting that in every other state 
which attempted to prosecute a woman in such a way, every state except Alabama and South 
Carolina has invalidated or overturned the convictions of pregnant drug users). See generally 
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (upholding the criminal conviction of a woman 
charged with child neglect for using cocaine during pregnancy).
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Hawaii, and Ohio have all struck down prosecutors’ attempts to use state drug laws to 
prosecute women for drug use during pregnancy.83
II. aNalysIs
The Alabama Supreme Court erred in holding that the State’s chemical endangerment 
statute extends to fetuses. Specifically, the court erred by holding that the term “child” 
was unambiguous and mistakenly found that the legislative intent of the law demonstrated 
that it was meant to apply to fetuses. The court then incorrectly concluded that the rule 
of lenity did not apply. The Alabama judiciary has a less than desirable track record 
concerning women’s rights, including abortion rights,84 and it seems the court offered a 
contrived opinion in order to arrive at the conclusion it set out to achieve.
a. The alabama supreme Court erred in finding that the term “child” as used in 
§ 26-15-3.2 of the alabama Code was unambiguous and included fetuses.
In a statutory construction case, a court’s first step “is to determine whether the language 
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in 
the case.”85 Only if the language is ambiguous, should the court employ other canons 
of construction.86 The Alabama Supreme Court thus properly began its analysis by 
assessing whether or not the statute in question was worded in an ambiguous manner, 
stating:
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, as in this case, courts 
must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their 
ordinary plain meaning—they must interpret that language to mean exactly 
what it says and thus give effect to the apparent intent of the Legislature.87
When the language is unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction; the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect—“it is [the judiciary’s 
job] to say what the law is, not to say what the law should be.”88
Section 26-15-3.2 states that a person commits the crime of chemical endangerment 
by exposing a child to an environment in which he or she knowingly, recklessly, or 
83 Motion for Leave and Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition of Amanda Helaine 
Kimbrough at 22-27, Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Motion 
for Leave] (citing Ex parte Perales, 215 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Johnson v. State, 602 
S.2d 1288, 1296-97 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. 
Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. App. 1991); Cochran v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W. 3d 325 (Ky. 
2010); State v. Geiser, 763 N.W.2d 469, 471-74 (N.D. 2009); State v. Wade, 232 S.W. 3d 663, 666 
(Mo. 2007); Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 313-14 (Md. 2006); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 
1214 (Haw. 2005); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 710 (Ohio 1992).
84 See Alabama, NaRal PRO-ChOICe ameRICa, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-
you/state-governments/state-profiles/alabama.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (assigning Alabama an 
"F" grade on choice related laws).
85 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
86 Id.
87 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *9 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746 
So.2d 960, 964 (Ala. 1999)).
88 Id.
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intentionally causes or permits a child to be exposed to, ingest or inhale, or have contact 
with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.89 The question 
of whether or not the statute was ambiguous turns on the meaning of the word “child.” 
To determine the meaning of the word “child,” the court looked at the two dictionary 
definitions presented by the State. The State relied on Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
defines “child” as a “baby or fetus” and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, which defines 
“child” as “an unborn or recently born person.”90 Relying on only these two definitions, 
the court held that the word “child” clearly included fetuses and thus ended its analysis 
of whether or not the term “child” was ambiguous.91
The court was incorrect in holding that the term “child” was unambiguous. While 
looking to a dictionary definition is a customary and well-accepted tool of statutory 
construction, a court need not limit its use of dictionary definitions to the ones presented 
by litigants. In countless other cases, the Alabama Supreme Court has furnished its 
own dictionary definitions, outside of the definitions provided by the parties before the 
court.92 To develop a thorough and balanced understanding of the word, the court could 
have and should have done so here. Instead, the court relied on these two dictionary 
definitions which mention unborn life, and ignored dictionary definitions which do 
not mention unborn life. For example, the Cambridge Dictionary defines “child” as a 
“boy or girl from the time of birth until he or she is an adult, or a son or daughter of 
any age,”93 and the Oxford Dictionary defines “child” as “a young human being below 
the age of puberty or below the legal age of majority . . . .”94 Likewise, the American 
Heritage Dictionary offers a number of definitions of the term, the first of which being 
“a person between birth and puberty.”95 Therefore, looking to the dictionary definition 
of “child” does not prove that the term is unambiguous, as some definitions of the term 
“child” include unborn life and some do not.
Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has previously stated that there are times when 
looking to the dictionary definition of a word will “leave reasonable doubt as to the 
meaning of ” the term in question96 and will not prove useful in resolving doubts and 
89 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2012).
90 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *11 (“As the definitions cited by the State indicate, the 
plain meaning of the word ‘child’ is broad enough to encompass all children – born and unborn—
including Ankrom’s and Kimbrough’s unborn children in the cases before us.”).
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Lambert v. Coregis Ins. Co., Inc., 950 So. 2d 1156, 1163 (Ala. 2006) (rejecting the 
dictionary definition presented by the petitioner and instead presenting the definitions of a separate 
dictionary); Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Trussville v. Tacala, Inc., 2013 WL 149060 at *7 
(Ala. Civ. App. April 12, 2013) (providing the dictionary definitions of the terms “extend,” “useful,” 
and “life” without the parties before the court having presented any dictionary definitions).
93 Child, CamBRIDGe DICTIONaRy Of ameRICaN eNGlISh (Cambridge University Press 2013), available 
at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/american-english/child?q=child.
94 Child, OxfORD DICTIONaRy Of ameRICaN eNGlISh (Oxford University Press 2013), available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/child.
95 Child, The ameRICaN heRITaGe DICTIONaRy Of The eNGlISh laNGUaGe (Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt Publishing Co., 5th Ed. 2013), available at http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.
html?q=child&submit.x=30&submit.y=26. 
96 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 309 (Ala. 1999).
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confusion as to a particular term’s scope.97 In such instances, the court has stated, 
reliance on those dictionary definitions is inappropriate.98 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that a dictionary definition of an undefined statutory term is not always 
dispositive of the term’s meaning.99 Therefore, simple reliance on the dictionary is not 
always sufficient to determine a statute’s meaning. Because the dictionary definitions 
of the term “child” do not resolve the question of whether the term includes a fetus 
or not, the dictionary definitions should not have been determinative of the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s decision. For the court to make such a decisive determination based 
on ambiguous dictionary definitions represented a subjective and one-sided assessment 
of the term.100
In addition to the dictionary definitions, further evidence demonstrates the ambiguity 
of the term “child” in § 26-15-3.2. After the chemical endangerment law was passed in 
2006, Alabama legislators made four attempts to amend the statute’s wording to clarify 
that the statute applies to both born children as well as fetuses.101 These attempted 
revisions demonstrate that the statute’s original wording was not definitive. If the term 
“child” was unambiguous, such legislators would not have needed to attempt to clarify 
the statute. Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court still found the term to be unambiguous.
The Alabama Supreme Court was wrong to conclude that “the plain meaning of the 
word ‘child’ is broad enough to encompass all children—born and unborn.”102 The 
mixed dictionary definitions and the attempted amendments to further explain what 
was meant by “child” demonstrate that the court erred in finding the term unambiguous.
B.  The alabama supreme Court mistakenly held that the alabama legislature 
intended § 26-15-3.2 to apply to drug use during pregnancy.
When a statute’s wording is ambiguous, courts are to engage in judicial interpretation of 
the statute by using various tools of statutory construction, including traditional canons 
of statutory interpretation, and the statute’s legislative history and purpose.103 Because 
the court found that the term “child” was unambiguous, the court did not employ 
97 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 309 (Ala. 1999); Espey By and Through 
Espey v. Convenience Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221, 1223 n. 1 (Ala. 1991) (finding that although 
there may be instances when it is necessary to base a judgment on dictionary definitions, this is an 
unduly narrow approach in some situations).
98 State Farm Fire, 747 So. 2d at 309.
99 See e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 
(2000).
100 See Imani Gandy, Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough: Victims of Alabama’s Personhood 
Agenda, Rh RealITy CheCk (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/01/18/
hope-ankrom-and-amanda-kimbrough-victims-alabama-supreme-courts-zeal-to-protect-u/ (referring 
to the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Ankrom as “judicial activism” and “the Alabama 
judiciary’s zeal to promote an anti-choice personhood agenda at the expense of pregnant women”).
101 Todd Brief, supra note 3 at 10; see infra Part II(b) for a discussion of the intent and failure of 
these subsequent amendments.
102 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *11 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).
103 Id. at *4 (“Principals of statutory construction instruct this court to interpret the plain language 
of the statute to mean exactly what it says and to engage in judicial construction only if the language 
in the statute is ambiguous.”); See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
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other tools of statutory interpretation.104 However, when one engages in such judicial 
construction, it is evident that § 26-15-3.2 was meant to protect children growing up 
around narcotics, and not fetuses exposed to chemical substances in utero.
In attempting to interpret statutes, courts often look to contemporaneous statements 
made by legislators during the legislative process.105 In the instant matter, a number 
of Alabama legislators spoke out against the use of this law to prosecute women for 
using drugs during pregnancy. For example, one of the law’s original sponsors, former 
Alabama State Senator Lowell Barron stated that he did not intend for the law to be 
used against new mothers, saying, “I hate to see a young mother put in prison away 
from her child . . . maybe we need to revisit the legislation.”106 Alabama Representative 
Patricia Todd submitted an amicus brief to the Alabama Supreme Court in support of 
Kimbrough and Ankrom.107 In her brief, Todd explicitly stated that the legislature had 
considered making the law applicable to pregnant women who use drugs, but expressly 
rejected the idea.108 She added that she was actively involved in the legislature’s ultimate 
refusal to adopt such measures and that the prosecutions were “contrary to the letter of 
the law and the express will of the Legislature.”109 Representative Jeffery McLaughlin 
stated that “there can be no prosecution under this bill for a woman who has exposed a 
child in the womb.”110
While the petitioners included Senator Barron’s statement in their brief, the court 
dismissed the statement as unpersuasive, noting in a footnote that “[f]ormer Senator 
Barron’s views are irrelevant; this Court will not rely solely on the views of a single 
legislator in ascertaining the intent of a bill, even when that legislator was a sponsor of 
the bill.”111 The court went on to provide a long string cite of court opinions from an 
assortment of jurisdictions indicating that legislator statements regarding the intent of 
the law should not be afforded too much weight.112
The court was incorrect in refusing to acknowledge such legislator statements. An 
equal number of opinions, including U.S. Supreme Court and Alabama court opinions, 
104 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *7 (“The term ‘child’ in § 26-15-3.2, ala. CODe 1975, is 
unambiguous; thus, this Court must interpret the plain language of the statute to mean exactly what 
it says and not engage in judicial construction of the language in the statute.”).
105 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n. 9 (1989) (looking to legislator 
statements to help determine the intent behind a federal employment discrimination law); Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (stating that a law’s purpose can be 
demonstrated by examining the statements of a decision-making body).
106 Phillip Rawls, National Ire Over Ala. Prosecuting Pregnant Moms, USa TODay, Aug. 1, 2008, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-08-01-4274196709_x.htm.
107 See generally Todd Brief, supra note 3.
108 Id. at 14.
109 Id. at 18.
110 H.B. 723, 2008 Sess. (Ala. 2008), Statement of Rep. McLaughlin, http://altaxdollarsatwork.
blogspot.com/2008/ 05/chemical-child-endangerment-debate.html (“My purpose in bringing this 
bill is to get help for that mother so she doesn’t do it again.”)
111 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *14 n. 8 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).
112 Id.
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do, rely heavily on legislators’ statements.113 The court should have taken all relevant 
case law into account in its analysis—even case law that says that a court may rely on 
legislator statements when determining legislative intent.
Similarly, the State argued that § 26-15-3.2 was clearly intended to apply to fetuses 
because the Alabama legislature “has stated that ‘[t]he public policy of the State of 
Alabama is to protect life, born, and unborn.’”114 While Alabama has stated its policy of 
protecting unborn life, it has also, on multiple occasions, stated its policy of protecting 
women, women’s health, and pregnant women.115 Statements regarding the State’s policy 
of protecting women should have been considered by the court alongside statements of 
policy regarding unborn life, but they were not and the court unquestioningly accepted 
the State’s assertion.
Next, Kimbrough and Ankrom argued that had the legislature intended the law to apply 
to fetuses, it would have said so in explicit terms, just as the legislature had done in 
other statutes.116 The petitioners cited the State’s Partial Birth Abortion Act which uses 
the word “fetus,” as well as the State’s Women’s Right to Know Act, which uses the 
term “unborn child.”117 In addition, in 2006, the same year that § 26-15-3.2 passed, the 
legislature amended the State’s homicide law to redefine “person” to include a fetus, 
demonstrating that when the legislature wants to make clear that a law applies to a fetus, 
it makes a conscious and explicit effort to do so.118
In response, the court stated that a review of such statutes “provides no conclusive 
evidence” as to how the court should interpret the word “child.”119 The court merely 
wrote that in the aforementioned examples, the legislature chose to use the words “fetus” 
and “unborn child” because those statues could simply not apply to born children.120 
Had the court delved deeper in its analysis, it may have noted that the legislature 
purposefully uses the term “child” differently than it uses the term “fetus” or “unborn 
child,” and understood that the term “child” does not encompass the term “fetus.”
In addition to the examples proffered by the petitioners, numerous other Alabama 
statutes differentiate between the terms “child” and “fetus.” Alabama’s abortion statute 
uses the term “unborn life.”121 Another Alabama statute reads that the death of a “fetus” 
113 See supra note 105.
114 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *13 (citing the state’s abortion law found at ala. CODe § 
26-22-1(a) (2012)).
115 See, e.g., ala. CODe § 22-12D-1 (establishing the Office of Women’s Health for the purpose 
of advocating for women’s health and identifying, coordinating, and establishing priorities for 
programs, services, and resources the state should provide for women’s health issues and concerns 
relating to the reproductive, menopausal, and postmenopausal phases of a woman’s life, with an 
emphasis on postmenopausal health); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 
1985) (stating that discrimination based on pregnancy violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
116 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *12.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at *13.
120 Id.
121 ala. CODe § 26-22-1 (1997).
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must be reported to a particular agency.122 Alabama’s organ donation statute states that 
the term “decedent” includes a “stillborn infant . . . or fetus.”123 Alabama property law 
refers to real estate which devises to any other person “born or unborn.”124 The state’s 
drivers’ licensing statute offers special rules if the applicant has custody of a “minor or 
unborn child.”125 It is evident from these statutes that Alabama legislators purposefully 
differentiate between life inside the womb and life outside the womb when drafting 
such laws. If the legislature had intended § 26-15-3.2 to apply to both fetuses and born 
children, the legislature would have written “child or fetus” or a “born or unborn child,” 
rather than just “child.”
Courts “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there.”126 The Alabama Supreme Court did not take heed of 
these instructions from the U.S. Supreme Court. The fact that the Alabama legislature 
only used the word “child” in the chemical endangerment law strongly indicates the 
legislature only intended the law to apply to children. For the court to say that the 
examples of other Alabama statutes offered by the petitioners “provide no conclusive 
evidence” sweeps very convincing evidence under the rug.
An additional argument advanced by the petitioners was that the legislative attempts 
to amend the chemical endangerment statute demonstrate that the original law was not 
meant to apply to fetuses.127 On four separate occasions, amendments were introduced 
to reword § 26-15-3.2 to state that for the purposes of this law, the term “child” includes 
fetuses and children.128 None of these bills were ever enacted. To these arguments the 
court replied that “interpreting a statute based on later attempts to amend that statute 
is problematic” because “several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such 
inaction . . . .”129
While that conclusion may be true in some circumstances, it is not true here, where it is 
abundantly clear why these amendments failed. During floor debates on these proposed 
amendments, Representative Patricia Todd, Representative Jeffery McLaughlin, 
Representative Pebblin Warren, Representative Dario Melton, and Representative 
Yusuf Salaam all discussed the implications of expanding the scope of the chemical 
endangerment law to allow for the prosecution of women who use drugs during 
pregnancy.130 Representatives expressed concerns about incarcerating drug users 
122 ala. CODe § 22-9A-13 (2012).
123 ala. CODe § 22-19-161 (2008).
124 ala. CODe § 19-3-170 (1975).
125 ala. CODe § 16-28-40 (2009).
126 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). 
127 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *13-14 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013). 
128 See Todd Brief, supra note 3, at 14 (“The rejection of two proposed amendments to the chemical 
endangerment law in the 2008 legislative session and two more in 2011 further demonstrates that 
the law was never intended to apply to a pregnant woman who uses a controlled substance during 
pregnancy.”).
129 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *15.
130 H.B. 723, 2008 Sess. (Ala. 2008), Statement of Rep. McLaughlin, http://altaxdollarsatwork.
blogspot.com/2008/05/chemical-child-endangerment-debate.html (“My purpose in bringing this bill 
is to get help for that mother so she doesn’t do it again.”).
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rather than offering them treatment, deterring women from seeking prenatal care, and 
encouraging abortions as a means to avoid criminal prosecution, and more.131 These 
concerns were never discussed when the chemical endangerment law was originally 
debated. That the proposed amendments raised concerns about the effect of the law on 
pregnant women while the original law did not raise such concerns, strongly supports 
the conclusion that the original chemical endangerment law was not intended to be used 
to prosecute a pregnant woman for endangering a fetus.
Moreover, the fact that the debate centered on expanding the scope of the law to make it 
apply to fetuses unequivocally demonstrates that the original bill had a narrower scope 
and did not apply to fetuses. Even more convincingly, a number of representatives who 
voted to pass the chemical endangerment law during its original passage in 2006 voted 
against these amendments, signifying an awareness of the major shift in the implications 
that the proposed amendments would create.132 Thus it is clear that in the case of 
Alabama’s chemical endangerment law, there were definite and identifiable reasons why 
the amendments were rejected. The court was therefore wrong to conclude that “several 
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . . .”133
While the court rejected the petitioner’s above-mentioned arguments, further analysis 
demonstrates that the law as written was not meant to apply to fetuses. First, Alabama 
enacted the chemical endangerment law on June 1, 2006. Thereafter, the Alabama 
Department of Human Resources (DHR) was tasked with promulgating rules and 
regulations to carry out the law.134 On April 30, 2008, the Department adopted a final 
rule defining the term “chemical endangerment.”135 The regulation reads as follows:
Chemical endangerment occurs when children are in a situation/
environment where, through direct or indirect exposure, they ingest or inhale 
a controlled substance (e.g., methamphetamine) or chemical substance 
(e.g., pseudoephedrine, freon, sulfuric acid, etc.) used in the production of 
methamphetamine and parents’/primary caregivers’ purpose for being in 
possession of the chemicals is to produce or manufacture crystal meth for 
personal use or distribution.136
No other definition of or commentary on the term “chemical endangerment” appears in 
Alabama’s regulatory code. According to the rule, chemical endangerment only occurs 
when the child is exposed to chemicals during the production of methamphetamine and 
when the parent possesses the chemicals to produce or manufacture methamphetamine. 
Methamphetamine cannot be produced or manufactured in the womb. Therefore 
the rule demonstrates that the intent of the law was to protect children growing 
131 Id.
132 Todd Brief, supra note 3, at 15.
133 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *15 (quoting Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
134 ala. aDmIN. CODe r. 660-1-3-.01 (1983).
135 ala. aDmIN. CODe r. 660-5-34-.02 (2008).
136 Id.
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up in methamphetamine labs. Under this regulation, a pregnant woman who uses 
methamphetamine has not committed chemical endangerment.
When the rule was adopted on August 30, 2008, the DHR was aware of pregnant women 
being charged under § 26-15-3.2 for use of narcotics during pregnancy. For example, 
on April 29, 2008, Amanda Kimbrough tested positive for methamphetamine at an 
Alabama hospital before receiving a C-section.137 Her test results were delivered to the 
DHR.138 A DHR social worker had spoken with her twice before and was aware that she 
had used methamphetamine.139 Even earlier than Kimbrough’s case, on July 26, 2005, 
Frieda Baker, Deputy Director of the Family and Children’s Services division of the DHR 
testified before the U.S. Congress about Alabama’s growing methamphetamine problem 
and the drastic effects that the problem has had on the State’s children.140 It is evident 
that the Department was aware that Alabama mothers were using methamphetamine 
during pregnancy. Yet, despite this knowledge, the Department still chose to promulgate 
the rule in a manner which could not logically apply to drug exposure in utero. The DHR 
administrators, hired for the purpose of developing and carrying out state social services 
regulations,141 were tasked with interpreting “chemical endangerment” and consciously 
did so by limiting the term to refer to exposure of children to chemicals used during 
methamphetamine production. Courts routinely give deference to agency interpretations 
of statutory language, and should have done so here.142
Second, according to the interpretation of the court in Ex parte Ankrom, it is now a felony 
for pregnant women to take many prescriptions which are lawfully prescribed to them, 
whether or not that prescription is harmful to the fetus. This interpretation by the court 
could not have been the intention of the legislature. Many prescription medications are 
considered “controlled substances” under the chemical endangerment statute:
Many types of schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled substances are medications, 
including painkillers, anti-seizure drugs, and stimulants that are routinely, 
appropriately prescribed for patients—including pregnant women. A recent 
survey of obstetricians and gynecologists found “that approximately a third 
137 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *3.
138 Id. at *4.
139 Id.
140 Fighting Meth in American’s Heartland: Assessing the Impact on Local Law Enforcement 
and Child Welfare Agencies, Hearing Before the Subcomm.on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 108 (2006) (statement 
of Freida Baker, Deputy Director of Family and Children’s Services, Alabama Department of 
Human Resources), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24946/html/CHRG-
109hhrg24946.htm.
141 See ala. CODe § 38-2-6 (1975); ala. aDmIN. CODe r. 660-1-2-.03 (1983).
142 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (U.S. 2002) (“In the context of an 
unambiguous statute, [the United States Supreme Court] need not contemplate deferring to the 
agency’s interpretation.”). See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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of their pregnant patients took at least one prescription medication other than 
prenatal vitamins during pregnancy prior to labor.”143
The petitioners noted that “many preexisting chronic conditions require continued 
drug management during pregnancy, and pregnant women may develop diseases or 
pregnancy-related disorders that require treatment during pregnancy.”144 Pregnant 
women are routinely issued prescriptions for conditions such as chlamydia, urinary tract 
infection, depressed mood, generalized anxiety disorder, chronic insomnia, asthma, 
major depressive disorder, hypertension, frequent/severe headaches, flu, and diabetes.145
Importantly, methadone, used for the treatment of opioid addiction—oftentimes during 
pregnancy—is a controlled substance covered by the chemical endangerment statute.146 
Methadone maintenance treatment is the standard of care for opioid dependence 
during pregnancy.147 There are numerous benefits of methadone use during pregnancy, 
including improved prenatal care, longer gestation, higher birth weight, and increased 
rates of infants discharged home in the care of their mothers.148 Alabama’s women rely 
on methadone for the purposes of opiate withdrawal: Alabama ranks seventh in the nation 
for states with the highest rates of methadone treatment users.149 The Alabama Supreme 
Court has thus made it a felony for pregnant women to take crucial medications, forcing 
them to choose between their health as well as the health of their child and jail time.
Even if a prescription medication taken by a pregnant woman did cause harm to the 
fetus, it is evident that the legislature would not condone prosecution of such an act. 
The State’s homicide law specifically states that a woman may not be charged with a 
homicide for causing the death of, or injury to, a fetus by taking medication prescribed 
to her.150 This indicates that the legislature wanted to protect women who took lawfully 
prescribed medications during pregnancy, even if those prescriptions caused death or 
injury to the fetus. Thus, it is illogical that the legislature would prosecute a woman for 
harm to a fetus caused by a prescription under § 26-15-3.2, but would not prosecute 
a woman for that exact same act under the State’s homicide law. In Ex parte Ankrom, 
the Alabama Supreme Court stated that it wanted to respect the intentions of the State 
legislature.151 Yet the court directly opposed the clear intent of the legislature when it 
ruled that the chemical endangerment statute could be used to prosecute a woman who 
takes necessary and often times lifesaving drugs during pregnancy.
143 Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 17 (citing Maria A. Morgan et al., Management of 
Prescription and Nonprescription Drug Use During Pregnancy, 23 j. maTeRNal-feTal & NeONaTal 
meD., 815-17 (2010)).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 20 (citing SUBSTaNCe aBUSe & meNTal healTh SeRvS. aDmIN., U.S. DeP’T Of healTh & 
hUmaN SeRvS., Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women, Pub. No. SMA 06-4124 (2006)).
147 Substance Use in Pregnancy, SOC. Of OBSTeTRICIaNS aND GyNaeCOlOGISTS Of CaNaDa (2011), 
http://sogc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/gui256CPG1104E.pdf.
148 Id.
149 alCOhOl, TOBaCCO, aND OTheR DRUGS: CONSUmPTION aND CONSeQUeNCeS IN alaBama, supra note 
16, at 62.
150 ala. CODe § 13A-6-4(b) (1988).
151 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *9, *18, *19 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013). 
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C. Because the petitioners had no notice of their alleged crime, the alabama 
supreme Court was incorrect in concluding that the rule of lenity did not apply.
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the state152 and due process requires 
that parties before the court have notice that their alleged conduct was proscribed by 
law.153 The notice given must provide ordinary persons with clear notice of what is 
prohibited.154 When no such notice exists, the rule of lenity applies and criminal statutes 
are to be construed in favor of the accused.155 Kimbrough and Ankrom argued that 
there was no notice that their conduct was illegal under § 26-15-3.2.156 Without much 
discussion, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that because the term “child” 
unambiguously includes fetuses, the rule of lenity did not apply.157
As demonstrated in Parts II(a) and II(b), the term “child” was ambiguous in its use. 
Section 26-15-3.2 states that a person commits the crime of “chemical endangerment” 
by exposing a child to an environment in which the child comes into contact with a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.158 To satisfy due 
process, “notice of a crime must provide ordinary persons with clear notice of what 
is prohibited.”159 This statute does not provide clear notice to ordinary persons. This 
case raised the question of whether the term “child” did or did not include fetuses. 
The question was debated by politicians, attorneys, judges, and others trained in legal 
scholarship throughout Alabama and the Nation. Once the question reached the Alabama 
Supreme Court, the decision still was not unanimous, as two judges dissented. When 
those trained in legal scholarship are unable to conclusively decipher the meaning of a 
term, an ordinary person without legal training cannot be expected to do so. As stated in 
the dissents of Chief Justice Malone and Justice Murdock, because the petitioners had 
no notice of their crime, the rule of lenity applied, and the court should have overturned 
their convictions.160
III. POlICy CONsIDeRaTIONs aND ReCOmmeNDaTIONs
In addition to the aforementioned legal concerns raised by § 26-15-3.2, the statute has 
a number of dangerous policy implications for Alabama’s women and families. While a 
few cases such as Hope Ankrom’s and Amanda Kimbrough’s have been sensationalized 
in the media, these stories represent just a few of the hundreds of women and families 
who are put in danger by the statute.161 The statute puts a vulnerable population 
(pregnant, usually low-income, substance-abusing women) at higher risk physically, 
152 See id. at *4 (citing Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 131 (2000)).
153 Id. at *25 (Malone, C.J., dissenting).
154 Id. at *26 (Murdock, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 887 n. 12 
(11th Cir. 1997)).
155 Id. at *9 (quoting Ex parte Bertram, 884 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 2003)).
156 Id. at *1-2.
157 Id. at *6-7.
158 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2012).
159 See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927-28 (2010).
160 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *24-26 (Malone, C., J. and Murdock, J., dissenting).
161 Ahrens, supra note 15, at 883-84 (referencing similar cases in Hawaii, Wyoming, and 
Oklahoma).
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emotionally, and financially. While this article does not endorse the use of narcotics, 
this article does warn that granting legal rights to a fetus is dangerous for women and 
that drug use should be treated with appropriate medical care rather than incarceration.
a. Personhood and abortion Rights
While Alabama’s chemical endangerment law has many tangible and specific 
consequences, the overarching danger of this law is that it creates legal rights for a fetus. 
When legal rights are given to a fetus, the legal rights of the pregnant woman carrying 
that fetus are automatically compromised. Granting legal rights to fetuses may snowball: 
if one legal right is given to a fetus, as is the case with the chemical endangerment laws, 
the door opens for granting additional rights, if not full, legal protections, to a fetus. 
Granting full legal rights to a fetus would create fetal personhood, and grant the fetus 
the same legal rights and protections as a human being. If fetuses are considered human 
beings for legal purposes, abortion becomes murder, and thus, illegal.
Moreover, recognition of a fetus as a person would be inconsistent with existing 
Alabama law. Like every other state in the U.S., Alabama does not legally recognize 
fetal personhood. Though attempts have been made in Alabama to pass such legislation, 
time and time again, the State legislature has actively chosen not to give legal rights 
to fetuses.162 Despite the State’s decision not to create such rights for the unborn, the 
Alabama Supreme Court opinion usurps this decision. The opinion, hailed as “sett[ing] 
the stage for [a] personhood amendment,”163 stands in stark contrast to the will of the 
legislature and dangerously compromises the legal rights of Alabama’s women.
B. Punishing Pregnancy
Section 26-15-3.2’s current use is problematic because it punishes women in a way that 
men cannot be punished. While possession or sale of illegal narcotics is a crime, use 
of narcotics is not. Generally speaking, because only women can become pregnant and 
because the Alabama Supreme Court has held that § 26-15-3.2 applies to narcotics use 
during pregnancy, § 26-15-3.2 punishes women, but not men, who use illegal narcotics. 
In addition to illegal narcotics, § 26-15-3.2 punishes women, but not men, who take 
medications lawfully prescribed to them by a health care provider—a punishment that, 
162 See S.B. 205, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013), S.B. 5, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012), H.B. 405, 2011 
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011), S.B. 301, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2010), S.B. 225, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 
2009), H.B. 348, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2008), H.B. 128, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2007); see also 
Historic Personhood Bills and Amendments Introduced in Alabama Legislature, PeRSONhOOD USa, 
available at http://www.personhoodusa.com/press-release/historic-pro-life-personhood-bills-and-
amendments-introduced-alabama-legislature/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (highlighting Alabama’s 
personhood movement and referring to it as “an effort to provide equal protection to unborn children 
by defining them as persons under the laws of Alabama”).
163 The Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Sets the Stage for Personhood Amendment, RIGhT RemeDy: 
a mINISTRy Of DR. PaTRICk jOhNSTON aND famIly, available at http://rightremedy.org/articles/399 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
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if convicted, can result in a felony conviction and up to life behind bars,164 making the 
statute’s gender disparity of grave severity.165
When women are punished for “deviant” behavior during pregnancy, it is not unlikely 
that the state will go on to punish women for other acts during pregnancy. Under the 
veil of fetal protection, that state could allow for the prosecution of pregnant women 
who drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, eat unhealthily, fail to seek prenatal care, drive 
recklessly, work at a location that exposes them to toxic fumes, attempt suicide, or stay 
in a physically abusive relationship. While such punishments may seem absurd, many of 
them have been proposed in states across the U.S., including Alabama.166 The chemical 
endangerment law begs the question—where does one draw the line? Punishing women 
solely due to their pregnancy status is a dangerous step towards future erosion of 
women’s rights.
C. Dangerous for the health of the Women, fetuses, and families
The interpretation of § 26-15-3.2 adopted by the court guarantees the opposite effect 
that prosecutors intended. Alabama State prosecutors urge that such prosecutions are 
necessary to protect unborn life.167 For three reasons, the interpretation of the law 
actually harms unborn life. First, healthcare in Alabama prisons ranks among the lowest 
in the nation:
In Alabama, medical care in prison is appalling. Alabama received an “F” 
rating for the delivery of prenatal care to pregnant inmates. Alabama is last 
in the nation in terms of per inmate medical spending. The Julia Tutwiler 
Prison for Women is overcrowded and has a history of failing to provide basic 
medical care, adequate hygiene, beds, ventilation, and nutrition. County jails 
in Alabama are similarly ill equipped to provide healthy environments to 
164 ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2013); ala. CODe § 13A-5-11(2013) (providing the fines required for 
each class of felony); ala. CODe § 13A-5-6 (2013) (providing the sentences of imprisonment for 
each class of felonies).
165 See Meghan Horn, Mothers Versus Babies: Constitutional and Policy Problems with 
Prosecutions for Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse, 14 Wm. & maRy j. WOmeN & l. 635, 648 
(2008) (“If prosecutors persist in seeking to hold women criminally responsible for fetal injuries as a 
result of parental substance abuse, they should apply the same statutes to new fathers with substance 
abuse problems.”).
166 See, e.g., Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (charging the 
defendant with murder and attempted feticide for attempting to commit suicide while pregnant); 
Smoking While Pregnant May be Illegal, aSSOCIaTeD PReSS (June 13, 2006, 4:51 PM), http://www.
fox16.com/news/story/Smoking-While-Pregnant-May-be-Illegal/P8kkEclKmE-5hB4mHZ-_Iw.cspx 
(discussing former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee’s proposal to ban pregnant women from 
smoking cigarettes); Punishing Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy An Approach 
That Undermines Women’s Health and Children’s Interests, CTR. fOR RePROD. RIGhTS 2 (2000) 
[hereinafter PUNIShING WOmeN], http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_bp_
punishingwomen.pdf (providing examples of criminal prosecutions against pregnant women who 
drank alcohol, failed to heed a doctor’s recommendation to remain on bed rest, and failed to heed a 
doctor’s recommendation to refrain from engaging in sexual intercourse).
167 See Steele, supra note 6.
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pregnant women. Such conditions are antithetical to the health and well-being 
of pregnant women and their fetuses.168
If a state is concerned about fetal life, it should not place pregnant women in prison, 
where the jails are among the most decrepit in the Nation and where healthcare and 
prenatal healthcare is nothing short of abominable.169
Second, overwhelming empirical research demonstrates that when women are threatened 
with punishment for illegal acts during pregnancy, those women will not seek vital prenatal 
medical care due to concern that their doctors will report them to the authorities.170 
The American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologist, among others, have spoken out on this issue and submitted amicus curiae 
briefs to the Alabama Supreme Court, stating that women will avoid prenatal care when 
they believe doctors are gathering evidence for law enforcement.171 While medical 
care is crucial for any pregnant woman and the fetus, it is even more crucial when that 
woman is using illegal narcotics.172 Quitting drugs cold turkey can be medically unsafe 
for both the mother and the fetus. It is therefore paramount that pregnant drug users and 
168 Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 15-16.
169 See Statement of Patricia Todd (audio recording), available at http://altaxdollarsatwork.blogspot.
com/2008/05/chemical-child-endangerment-debate.html (discussing the deplorable healthcare 
of Alabama’s prisons and how dangerous it is for a pregnant women to be forced to live in such 
conditions in relation to H.B. 723, 2008 Sess. (Ala. 2008)).
170 See Steele, supra note 6 (“By effect, some gynecologists say, prosecuting mothers harms infants 
more than helps them: Prenatal attention ‘can greatly reduce the negative effects of substance 
abuse during pregnancy,’ according to Dr. David Garry, a New York obstetrician and member of the 
American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. When women aren’t getting it, that risk 
goes up.”).
171 See Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 4 (written by National Advocates for Pregnant 
Women and the Southern Poverty Law Center and signed onto by the American Academy of 
Addiction Psychiatry, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Psychiatric 
Association, American Medical Women’s Association, American Nurses Association, The Alabama 
Women’s Resource Network, American Society of Addiction Medicine, Black Women’s Health 
Imperative, Child Welfare Organizing Project, Global Lawyers and Physicians, Harm Reduction 
Coalition, Institute for Health and Recovery, International Center for Advancement of Addiction 
Treatment of the Beth Israel Medical Center Baron Edmond de Rothschild Chemical Dependency 
Institute, International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, International Doctors for Healthy Drug 
Policies, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, Legal Action Center, National Asian 
Pacific American Women’s Forum, National Association of Nurse Practitioners in Women’s Health, 
National Association of Social Workers, Alabama Chapter, National Council on Alcoholism and 
Drug Dependence, Inc., National Institute for Reproductive Health, National Latina Institute for 
Reproductive Health, National Organization for Women – Alabama, National Perinatal Association, 
National Women’s Health Network, National Women’s Law Center, Our Bodies Ourselves, Southern 
Center for Human Rights, Pippa Abston, MD, PhD, FAAP, Sheila Blume, MD, Susan C. Boyd, PhD, 
Wendy Chavkin, MPH, MD, Nancy Day, MPH, PhD, Gabriele Fischer, MD, Deborah A. Frank, 
MD, Leslie Hartley Gise, MD, Stephen R. Kandall, MD, Howard Minkoff, MD, Daniel R. Neuspiel, 
MD, MPH, Robert G. Newman, MD, MPH, Linda Worley, MD, Trecia Wouldes, PhD, and Tricia E. 
Wright, MD, MS).
172 Steele, supra note 6 (stating that the nurse manager for the obstetrics (OB) department 
acknowledged that pregnant women who are struggling with drug problems already are scared of 
getting help for their addictions or prenatal care because they do not want DHR to take away their 
babies).
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their doctors develop safe and trusting relationships, as well as attainable medical plans 
during pregnancies.
In addition, critics of the law suggest that women may choose to leave the State during 
labor to deliver their child outside of Alabama to avoid prosecution.173 Such a journey 
may create delay in receipt of medical attention and poses significant health risks for 
both mother and child. If Alabama prosecutors are truly concerned about the welfare of 
the State’s unborn, they should encourage women to seek prenatal care and immediate 
access to medical care when experiencing symptoms of labor, rather than deter them 
from doing so with the threat of incarceration.
Third, while the State prosecutors urge that this law will protect unborn life, such a 
policy will likely encourage abortion.174 A woman convicted under the chemical 
endangerment law could face up to life behind bars and a fine of up to $60,000.175 The 
law forces women to choose between an abortion and jail time. National Advocates 
for Pregnant Women state that the law will actually increase instances of abortion in 
Alabama:
Although it is difficult to know how frequently abortions result from fear of 
prosecution, one study reported that “two-thirds of the women [surveyed] 
who reported using [c]ocaine during their pregnancies…considered having an 
abortion.” In at least one well-documented case, a woman did obtain an abortion 
to win her release from jail and prevent prosecution. In State v. Greywind, a 
pregnant woman accused of child endangerment, based on alleged harm to 
her fetus from drugs she had taken, obtained an abortion. The prosecutor then 
dropped the charge.176
State prosecutors claiming to protect future life are, in actuality, incentivizing women to 
end their pregnancies rather than carry them to term.
Additionally, women convicted under § 26-15-3.2 are likely to be living below the 
poverty line.  The largest population of methamphetamine users tends to be the Caucasian 
rural poor.177 Within Alabama, the State’s overall poverty rate is 17.5 percent with 
rural areas having a higher poverty level than urban areas.178 Nearly half of Alabama’s 
methamphetamine users are female and ninety-two percent of Alabama’s drug users are 
white.179 Abortion can be incredibly expensive and even cost prohibitive to a woman 
173 Cf. id.
174 Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at *25 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013) (Malone, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
chemical-endangerment statute will now supply women who have, either intentionally or not, run 
afoul of the proscriptions of the statute a strong incentive to terminate their pregnancy.”).
175 § 26-15-3.2; § 13A-5-11; § 13A-5-6.
176 Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 11-12.
177 See Ahrens, supra note 15, at 884-85, 895.
178 alCOhOl, TOBaCCO, aND OTheR DRUGS: CONSUmPTION aND CONSeQUeNCeS IN alaBama, supra note 
16, at 5.
179 Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions by Primary Substance of Abuse According to Sex, Age 
Group, Race, and Ethnicity Year = 2010, SUBSTaNCe aBUSe aND meNTal healTh SeRv. aDmIN., CTR. 
fOR BehavIORal healTh STaTISTICS aND QUalITy, http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/webt/quicklink/AL10.
htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
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lacking in financial resources. Thus, a woman facing conviction under § 26-15-3.2 
who can afford an abortion can bypass a felony conviction by obtaining one, while a 
woman facing conviction under § 26-15-3.2 who cannot afford an abortion would have 
no choice but to accept a felony conviction. Therefore, the law may disproportionately 
affect the poor because the poor are less likely to be able to afford the one escape from 
prosecution under § 26-15-3.2: an abortion.
Not only does § 26-15-3.2 harm women and fetuses, but it also harms Alabama’s 
families as well. The law hurts the spouses, significant others, the dependents, including 
other children that are left behind when women convicted under § 26-15-3.2 are put 
in prison.180 Such economic consequences have a particularly devastating effect on 
low-income families.181 Currently, Alabama prosecutes pregnant women who use 
harder drugs, specifically cocaine, methamphetamine, and other opiates—drugs which 
tend to be used more in poor communities.182 These already financially devastated 
communities become even more entrenched in poverty when incarceration is used as 
a tool for punishing drug use.183 Conviction under § 26-15-3.2 results in heavy jail 
time and exorbitant monetary fees.184 In addition, such families must gather the money 
for lawyers’ fees and bails often set at $500,000.185 Moreover, such a conviction could 
carry severe collateral consequences at a state and federal level. Depending on the 
type of conviction, a woman guilty of violating the chemical endangerment law can 
180 See Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 3-4 (“[A]mici contend that the relevant medical and 
scientific research does not support the prosecution of women who use a controlled substance and 
continue to term for the crime of ‘chemical endangerment’ and that such prosecutions undermine 
maternal and fetal health. Amici recognize a strong societal interest in protecting the health of 
women, children, and families. In the view of amici, however, such interests are undermined, not 
advanced, by the judicial expansion of the chemical endangerment law to apply to pregnant women 
who seek to continue their pregnancies to term despite a drug problem.”).
181 See, e.g., Marcos Ortiz, Meth Bust Sends Family into Poverty, aBC NeWS, May 5, 2013, http://
www.abc4.com/content/news/top_stories/story/Meth-bust-sends-family intopoverty/2l_4Dj5l00S7p
qlCVaP9aA.cspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
182 See Filipovic, supra note 81 (“So they focus on the most vulnerable, least sympathetic pregnant 
women first and establish the rights of fetuses there. They can’t go right for the prescription-
drug-using upper-middle-class white women, in part because those women are considered at least 
marginally important in society, and in part because the people doing the prosecuting come from 
the same backgrounds and social classes as upper-middle-class white women and are therefore less 
likely to easily tag those women as criminals and unfit mothers. So women of colour, poor women 
and rural women are the targets, and they’re having a wide pro-life strategy built on their backs.”).
183 Sasha Abramsky, Toxic Persons: New Research Shows Precisely How the Prison-to-Poverty 
Cycle Does its Damage, SlaTe (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2010/10/toxic_persons.single.html (reporting that children of prisoners are more 
likely to live in poverty, to end up on welfare, and to suffer the sorts of serious emotional problems 
that tend to make holding down jobs more difficult).
184 See ala. CODe §§ 26-15-3.2, 13A-5-11, 13A-5-6 (2013); see also ala. CODe § 26-15-3.2 (2013) 
(noting that judges may choose to apply another provision of the law only if it provides a harsher 
penalty than this section).
185 Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, Ny TImeS, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad-mothers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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be denied public assistance and food stamps for the rest of her life,186 can be denied 
public housing,187 can be asked during a job interview about her past convictions and 
denied employment on the basis of those convictions,188 can lose her license to practice 
a regulated profession,189 can be denied federal welfare benefits,190 can be denied social 
security benefits while imprisoned,191 and more.
In addition, conviction under § 26-15-3.2 takes a heavy toll on the family’s children. 
Ankrom, for instance, has three young children. Her prosecution under § 26-15-3.2 
means that those children have to cope with the stress and turmoil of their mother being 
taken to prison and their mother carrying a felony conviction for the rest of their lives. 
Like Kimbrough, mothers convicted under such chemical endangerment laws may have 
their children taken away from them and even placed into the foster care system. In 
Alabama, the DHR performed 2,432 child removals from a home due to alcohol and/
or drug abuse in fiscal year 2010.192 Most of these removals were due to drug abuse 
by a parent.193 For a law which prosecutors say is meant to protect the child-to-be, its 
application seems to forget about the best interests of the child that already is.
Lastly, there are enormous economic costs resulting from conviction under § 26-15-3.2 
which can have an extremely devastating impact on Alabama’s families. Once released 
from prison, a woman charged under § 26-15-3.2 must overcome the stigma associated 
with her conviction and the felony conviction on her record, making it difficult, if not 
impossible, for her to find employment. Ankrom, for example, was studying to be a 
physical-therapy assistant. Due to her conviction, it has become impossible for her to 
find work.194 She now stays home with the children full time.195
186 See After Prison: Roadblocks to Reentry, leGal aCTION CTR, http://lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/
main.php?view=profile&subaction1=AL (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (explaining Alabama’s collateral 
consequences); see also A Report on State Legal Barriers Facing People with Criminal Records, 
leGal aCTION CTR., available at http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/reportcards/5_
Image_Alabama%20final.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 David McKnight, Criminal Law and Civil Death: The Collateral Consequences in Alabama, 
ReeNTRy NeT (2012), http://www.reentry.net/library/item.411672-Criminal_Law_and_Civil_Death_
The_Collateral_Consequences_in_Alabama (citing ala. CODe § 38-13-2(31) (1975)).
190 Consequences for People with Criminal Records: 2011-2012 Legislative Round-Up, am. CIvIl 
lIBeRTIeS UNION, eT al. 12 (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/State%20Collateral%20
Consequences%20Legislative%20Roundup%20Sept%202012%20(1).pdf
191 McKnight, supra note 189 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.468 (2013) (stating that “no monthly benefits 
will be paid to any individual for any month . . . the individual is confined . . . for conviction of a 
felony”).
192 alCOhOl, TOBaCCO, aND OTheR DRUGS: CONSUmPTION aND CONSeQUeNCeS IN alaBama, supra note 
16, at 90.
193 Id.
194 Calhoun, supra note 185.
195 Id.
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D. Recommendations
Both the World Health Organization and the American Psychiatric Association 
classify substance abuse as a disease, and the American Medical Association explains 
that “addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower.”196 As 
the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education explains, 
“[t]hese women are addicts who become pregnant, not pregnant women who decide to 
use drugs.”197 As such, drug use should be treated with health care, not incarceration.198
While some drug treatment programs are specifically tailored for pregnant and parenting 
women to help them overcome their addictions and improve birth outcomes, such 
programs are extremely rare and overburdened.199 A number of factors contribute to 
this shortage of programs and willingness of pregnant women to utilize them. First, 
numerous barriers exist to treatment for pregnant women including stigma, lack of 
financial resources, lack of child care, fear of losing custody of children, and fear of 
prosecution.200 Second, the private insurance industry does not support coverage for 
alcohol and drug treatment,201 making rehab cost-prohibitive for many pregnant women 
struggling with addiction. Third, many rehab programs are unable or unwilling to 
provide pregnant women with both addiction treatment and prenatal medical care.202 
These programs often report fear of program liability, inability to care for infants, lack 
of services for other children while mothers are in treatment, lack of financial resources, 
and limited staff training and knowledge about pregnancy and substance use.203
The circumstances are no different in Alabama. The State’s lack of resources for 
pregnant, drug-addicted mothers is one of the biggest problems contributing to the rise in 
infants born with drug withdrawal symptoms.204 Many of the State’s drug rehabilitation 
programs will not take pregnant women due to the added health care responsibilities 
associated with treating drug-addicted women who are pregnant.205
As discussed, punishing pregnant women through felony conviction is damaging to the 
women, to the fetuses, and to the families involved. Alabama lawmakers should correct 
the dangerous decision rendered by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Ankrom by 
196 PUNIShING WOmeN, supra note 166, at 7. 
197 Id.
198 See Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 7 (citing the recommendations of the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists regarding substance use and/or abuse during pregnancy).
199 Id. (citing a 1991 report by the Federal General Accounting Office that found that the most 
critical barrier to women’s treatment “is the lack of adequate treatment capacity and appropriate 
services among programs that will treat pregnant women and mothers with young children”).
200 Facts About Drug Treatment, NaT’l aDvOCaTeS fOR PReGNaNT WOmeN, http://www.
advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/crackfacts.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
201 Id.
202 Substance Abuse Treatment: Addressing the Specific Needs of Women, SUBSTaNCe aBUSe aND 
meNTal healTh SeRv. aDmIN. (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK83238/.
203 Id.
204 See Steele, supra note 6.
205 See id.
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clarifying that the law may not be used to prosecute women for the exposure of a fetus 
to controlled substances or chemical substances in utero.
CONClUsION
The Supreme Court of Alabama engaged in judicial activism when it incorrectly upheld 
Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough’s convictions. The court erred when it held the 
term “child” to be unambiguous and ignored the unequivocal evidence provided by the 
legislative history. The court also erred in not applying the rule of lenity. Importantly, the 
court ignored the over forty health care professionals, medical, social, and legal groups, 
including the American Medical Association, American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, and American Psychiatric Association, which appeared as amici in Ex 
parte Ankrom, warning the court of the dangerous implications of criminalizing drug 
use during pregnancy.206
“A court must not rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court’s idea of 
orderliness and public policy.”207 Rather than acting as neutral arbiters, the judges 
acted as advocates, legislating from the bench and refusing to engage in a deep analysis 
and true consideration of the law’s intent. When a court ignores both precedent and 
congressional intent, it embarks upon a dangerous path, where parties before the court 
come to fear its unpredictability, rather than seek refuge in its commitment to justice. 
As a result of Ex parte Ankrom, Alabama’s women have been pushed to the peripheral 
and left in an extremely precarious position, forced to grapple with the rewritten and 
damaging policy of the Alabama Supreme Court. 
206 See Motion of the American Medical Association and Medical Association of Alabama to 
Appear as Amici Curiae and Adopt, in part, the Briefs of Amici Curiae Filed by the American 
Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, et al., in Support of the Petitioners, Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 
WL 135748 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013); see also Motion for Leave, supra note 83, at 4 (written by 
National Advocates for Pregnant Women and the Southern Poverty Law Center and signed onto 
by the American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, American Psychiatric Association, American Medical Women’s Association, 
American Nurses Association, The Alabama Women’s Resource Network, American Society 
of Addiction Medicine, Black Women’s Health Imperative, Child Welfare Organizing Project, 
Global Lawyers and Physicians, Harm Reduction Coalition, Institute for Health and Recovery, 
International Center for Advancement of Addiction Treatment of the Beth Israel Medical Center 
Baron Edmond de Rothschild Chemical Dependency Institute, International Centre for Science in 
Drug Policy, International Doctors for Healthy Drug Policies, International Mental Disability Law 
Reform Project, Legal Action Center, National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum, National 
Association of Nurse Practitioners in Women’s Health, National Association of Social Workers and 
National Association of Social Workers, Alabama Chapter, National Council on Alcoholism and 
Drug Dependence, Inc., National Institute for Reproductive Health, National Latina Institute for 
Reproductive Health, National Organization for Women – Alabama, National Perinatal Association, 
National Women’s Health Network, National Women’s Law Center, Our Bodies Ourselves, Southern 
Center for Human Rights, Pippa Abston, MD, PhD, FAAP, Sheila Blume, MD, Susan C. Boyd, PhD, 
Wendy Chavkin, MPH, MD, Nancy Day, MPH, PhD, Gabriele Fischer, MD, Deborah A. Frank, 
MD, Leslie Hartley Gise, MD, Stephen R. Kandall, MD, Howard Minkoff, MD, Daniel R. Neuspiel, 
MD, MPH, Robert G. Newman, MD, MPH, Linda Worley, MD, Trecia Wouldes, PhD, and Tricia E. 
Wright, MD, MS).
207 People v. Freed, 766 N.E.2d 253, 262 (4th Dist. 2002).
